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I. INTRODUCTION
Legislatures and courts have implemented alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) in various forms across the United States because it
reduces the pressures on overburdened court systems by promoting trial
avoidance.' ADR can relieve court congestion, minimize delay, and
lower court costs by providing alternative forums for dispute resolution,
and by encouraging settlement. In fact, the primary purpose of ADR,
and its major attraction for legislative and judicial bodies, is docket
reduction.3
Compulsory ADR and its attendant penalty provisions further
docket reduction. Under compulsory ADR, judges can compel disputants
to use ADR before resorting to trial. In many states, compulsory ADR is
supplemented with penalty provisions. Such provisions authorize judges
to financially punish disputants who reject ADR decisions and request
trials de novo, but only when the trial outcome is not more favorable for
those disputants than the ADR decision.4  Using both compulsory ADR
and penalty provisions, federal judges can coerce settlement, which is
1. Dean Roscoe Pound's prophetic comments to the 1906 American Bar Association
were credited with originating concern over a court system behind the times in its inability
to address its growth with its existing structure. Ironically, Dean Pound discouraged
expanding judicial systems by increasing review levels. Pound would not embrace
compulsory nonbinding ADR followed by trials de novo after rejection of ADR decisions.
Dean Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 35 F.R.D. 241, 284-89. See also Earl Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for
Bench and Bar Alike, 44 A.B.A. J. 1043 (1958).
2. Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The
Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. RE'. 487, 488 (1989); Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H.
Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 43, 43 (1980); A. Leo Levin &
Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L.
REV. 29, 31 (1985); Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the
Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787, 797 (1983); Simon H.
Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 79, 101 (1976); Justin A.
Stanley, Minor Dispute Resolution, 68 A.B.A. J. 62 (1982); Steven Weller, John C. Ruhnka
& John P. Martin, The Rochester Answer to Court Backlogs, 20 JUDGES 36, 36 (Summer,
1981); William E. Craco, Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to
Order Summary Jury Trial Participation, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 483, 483 n.2 (1988); Paul
Mattingly, Note, Compelled Participation in Summary Jury Trials: A Tale of Two Cases, 77
KY. L. REV. 421, 421 (1988-89).
3. E.D. WASH. R. 39.1(a); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1141.10(a) (West 1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 2-1001A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A (West 1987);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1801 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 1, comment.
See also Warren E. Burger, !sn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982);
Thomas D. Lambros, The -Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984); Warren, supra note 1, at 1043.
4. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
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forbidden judicial conduct under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.s Further, compulsory ADR and its penalty provisions call into
question the impartiality of overworked judges who have developed rules,
or encouraged legislation which promotes mandatory ADR with penalties.
This Note identifies the three forms of compulsory nonbinding
ADR and their creating statutes or rules. The identified statutes and rules
are limited to general, rather than issue-specific forms of ADR.' Penalty
provisions in the cited statutes are presented, and their constitutionality is
briefly discussed. Finally, the propriety of such penalty provisions is
questioned. The Note concludes with a recommendation to abandon
penalty provisions and instead, to address overburdened dockets by
sanctioning attorneys for pursuing frivolous litigation.
II. COMPULSORY NONBINDING ADR
Statutes and court rules designate ADR as compulsory and
nonbinding. To date, statutes and rules have generated three forms of
compulsory nonbinding ADR: arbitration, mediation, and summary jury
trials.
Arbitration is by far the most prevalent compulsory nonbinding
ADR form The arbitration process involves a hearing where an
appointed or selected neutral party reviews evidence and renders a
decision. Witnesses testify, and the parties present and challenge
documentary evidence. Arbitrations are similar to bench trials with fewer
5. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
6. General ADR statutes and rules are not limited to a specific kind of dispute. Issue
specific ADR statutes and rules are limited to a particular kind of dispute, such as child
custody or employer-employee disputes.
7. N.D. CAL. R. 500-1; M.D. FLA. R. 8.02; N.D. IND. R. 32; S.D. IND. R. 33; W.D.
MICH. R. 43; W.D. MO. R. 30; D. NEv. R. 185; M.D.N.C. R. 602; N.D. OHIO R. 17.02;
S.D. OHIO R. 4.4; W.D. OKLA. R. 43; E.D. PA. R. 8; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-133.A
(Supp. 1990); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.11(c)(West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-22-401 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-549n (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
44.103(1) (West Supp. 1991); HAW. REv. STAT. § 601-20 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, 2-1001A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.74, subdiv. 1 (West
1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-20 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 33.360 (1988);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7361 (Purdon 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.06.010 (Supp.
1991); ARIZ. UNIF. ARB. R. PROC. 1; CAL. JUD. ARB. R. 1600; DEL. SUPER. CT. C.P.R. 16(c);
D.C. SUPER. CT. MAN. ARB. R. III; FLA. C.P.R. 1.700; ILL. SUP. CT. R. ch. l10A, 86;
N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 1-9; R.I. SUPER. CT. ARB. OF Civ. ACTIONS R. 1; WASH. SUPER. CT.
MAND. ARB. R. 2.2(a).
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formalities.
Mediation is the second most prevalent form of compulsory
nonbinding ADR. 9 As the least formal of the compulsory nonbinding
ADR forms, mediation entails settlement negotiation through a neutral
party. The mediator may not impose a settlement or express settlement
preferences. The final agreement, as opposed to a judicial decision, is the
disputants'. Witnesses and documentary evidence are usually not
required. 0
Mediation is startlingly absent in general ADR rules and statutes,
which may confirm docket reduction as the apparent motive behind those
general rules and statutes. Mediation appears more frequently in
topic-specific ADR statutes and rules than in general ADR statutes and
rules." One may speculate that because mediation is concentrated in
personal relationship-sensitive areas, it is selected by courts or legislatures
for its unique personal relationship-preservation features," rather than its
8. Golann, supra note 2, at 498; Deborah R. Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know
About Court-Adnilnistered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270, 271 (February - March, 1986);
Levin & Golash, supra note 2, at 32; Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 2, at 801-04; Weller,
Ruhnka & Martin, supra note 2, at 38.
9. M.D. FLA. R. 9.03; N.D. IND. R. 32; S.D. IND. R. 33; E.D. MICH. R. 32; W.D.
MICH. R. 42; D. NEv. R. 185; N.D. OHIO R. 17.02; S.D. OHIO R. 4.5; E.D. WASH. R.
39.1; COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-311 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102 (West Supp. 1991);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4951 (West 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1801-06
(West Supp. 1991); FLA. C.P.R. 1.700.
10. WAYNE D. BRAztI, EFFECTVE APPROACHES TO SEIr.EMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAwEs
AND JUDGES 17 - 20 (1988); JOHN W. KELTNER, MEDIATION: TOWARD A CIVIUZED SYSTEM OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 23-25 (1987); NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW
POUCY PRACTICE 1, 7 (1989); Golann, supra note 2, at 497; Levin & Golash, supra note 2, at
36; Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUST. SYS. J.
420, 422 (Spring 1982).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (West Supp. 1991) (annulment, separation, visitation
rights); CAL. C1V. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1991) (divorce custody); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
48260.6 (West Supp. 1991) (truancy); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601.1 (West Supp. 1991)
(truancy); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5(4) (1987) (child custody); COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-129.5(1)(c) (1987) (visitation rights); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.428 (West 1988) (family
mediation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598A (West Supp. 1991) (family disputes); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 9:351 (West Supp. 1991) (child custody and visitation); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 214 (Supp. 1990) (child support); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 581(4) (Supp. 1990)
(marital separation); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 636 (Supp. 1990) (divorce); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 665 (Supp. 1990) (annulment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752
(Supp. 1990) (child custody); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.513 (West 1988) (domestic
relations); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-462(4) (1989) (surrogate parent for handicapped
children); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (Supp. 1990) (marital affairs); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-12-5 (Supp. 1989) (domestic relations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (Supp. 1990)(child
custody); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1 (Supp. 1989) (child custody); OR. REv. STAT. §
107.755 (1990) (divorce, annulment, separation, child custody); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
26.09.015 (Supp. 1991) (divorce); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(5) (West Supp. 1990) (child
custody, divorce, family relations); MD. CT. R. S73A (child custody and visitation); MICH.
CT. R. 3.211 (domestic relations).
12. Id.; ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, at 35 (mediation gives participants more
control over resolution of their disputes; the non-adversarial format promotes maintaining
relationships).
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
docket reduction features. Consequently, the absence of mediation in
general ADR rules and statutes, may indicate that the general rules and
statutes are not intended to address disputants' needs and relationships, but
are designed to address docket reduction.
Summary jury trials (SJT) are the least employed form of
compulsory nonbinding ADR. 3 This little recognized ADR form is a
relative newcomer to the ADR scene. Judge Thomas Lambros, District
Court Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, created the SJT in 1980.14
The SJT gives parties an opportunity to try their cases in an abbreviated
form before a jury. The parties present descriptions of expected
testimony and excerpts of expected evidence. In theory, the jury in a SJT
should decide the case without knowledge that it is rendering an advisory
decision. The SJT facilitates recognition of case merits, sometimes
making settlement more attractive.' s
Statutes and court rules can make all three forms of ADR
compulsory and nonbinding in the same manner. The statutes and rules
make ADR compulsory either by permitting courts to order ADR,"6 or by
designation.17 Similarly, the statutes and rules render ADR nonbinding by
express language,"3 or by providing for the right to a trial de novo upon
rejection of the ADR decision. 9 However, the label "nonbinding" may be
13. C.D. ILL. R. 17(E); N.D. IND. R. 32; S.D. IND. R. 33; W.D. MICH. R. 44; D.
NEv. R. 185; N.D. OHIO R. 17.02; S.D. OHIO R. 4.5; M.D. PA. R. 513.
14. Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 463. (Jan. 1984).
15. Golann, supra note 2, at 499, 500; Lambros, supra note 14, at 470; Lambros &
Shunk, supra note 2, at 46.
16. M.D. FLA. R. 9.03; C.D. ILL. R. 17(E); N.D. IND. R. 32; S.D. IND. R. 33; E.D.
MICH. R. 32(a); W.D. MICH. R. 42(a); D. NEv. R. 185; N.D. OHIO R. 17.02; S.D. OHIO R.
4.5; E.D. WASH. R. 39.1(c); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.133A (Supp. 1990); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 1141.11(c) (West Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-549n-aa (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(1), 103(1) (West Supp. 1991); HAW. REv. STAT. §
601-20 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.74 (West 1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7361(a) (Purdon 1982); ARIZ. ARB. PROC. R. l(b); CAL. R. 1600; DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 16(e);
FLA. C.P.R. 1.700(a), 1.730; N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 1; R.I. SUPER. CT. CiV. ACTION ARB. R.
1; WASH. SUPER. CT. MAND. ARB. R. 2.2(a).
17. N.D. CAL. R. 500-1; M.D. FLA. R. 8.02; D.C.N.J. R. 47C; W.D.MICH. R.
43(e)(1); W.D. Mo. R. 30.C; M.D.N.C. R. 602(a); S.D. OHIO R. 4.4; W.D. OKLA. R.
43(B)(2); E.D. PA. R. 8.3; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-401 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
2-1001A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-20 (West Supp. 1991); OR.
REV. STAT. § 33.360 (1988); D.C. SUPER. CT. MAND. ARB. R. III; ILL. SUP. CT. R. ch. 1 10A,
q 86(a).
18. S.D. OHIO R. 4.4; W.D. OKLA. R. 43(B)(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.74 (West
1990).
19. N.D. CAL. R. 500-7(a); M.D. FLA. R. 8.06(a); E.D. MICH. R. 320); W.D. MICH.
R. 43(1)(3); W.D. Mo. R. 30.1; D.C.N.J. R. 47G; M.D.N.C. R. 608; W.D. OKLA. R.
43(P)(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-133H (Supp. 1990); CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE § 1141.20
(West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-405 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-549Z
(West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.103(5) (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
q 2-1004A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 23A-26 (West Supp. 1991); OR.
REv. STAT. § 33.400(2)(a) (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361(d) (Purdon 1982); WASH.
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a misnomer when penalty provisions are included.
III. PENALTY PROVISIONS AND THEIR CONSTrrUTIONALITY
ADR rules and statutes permit requests for trials de novo when
parties are dissatisfied with ADR decisions. The purpose of this right to a
trial de novo is to prevent unconstitutional denial of trial rights.
However, compulsory ADR penalty provisions may, in effect, render
trials de novo illusory constitutional protections.
A. Penalty Provisions
ADR participants may freely request trials de novo, however,
strings are attached. If the requesting disputant does not improve on the
compulsory ADR decision at trial, most states and courts require that the
disputant be punished.
Courts and state legislatures have devised a variety of penalty
arrangements. All penalties are contingent on the trial de novo petitioner
receiving a trial judgment which is not better than the ADR decision.
Some states and courts require deposit of a forfeitable arbitrator's feeP or
a flat penalty fee21 with the trial petition. The requesting disputant forfeits
the deposited funds if that disputant fares no better at trial than in the
ADR decision. Other courts and states require payment of trial court
costs;" costs and the opponent's attorney's fees; "3 or costs, attorney's
fees, the opponent's investigation costs and expert witness expenses and
fees.Y Combinations of flat penalty fees and trial costs or arbitrator
REv. CODE ANN. § 7.06.050 (Supp. 1991); ARtZ. ARB. R. 7(a); CAL. CT. R. 1616(a); DEL.
SUPER. CT. R. 16(c)(8)(A); D.C. SUPER. CT. MAND. ARB. R. XIII; FLA. C.P.R. 1.820(h); ILL.
SUP. CT. R. ch. 1 10A, 93(a); N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 5; R.I. SUPER. CT. Civ. ACTION ARB.
R. 5; WASH. SUPER. CT. MAND. ARH. R. 7.1(a).
20. W.D. Mo.R. 30J.2; M.D.N.C. R. 608(a), (e); W.D. OKLA. R. 43(P)(3)(4); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-27 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. CT. ORD. ARB. R. 5(b).
21. M.D. FLA. R. 8.06; D.NJ. R. 47(G)(3); E.D. PA. R. 8.7.E; ILL. SUP. CT. R. ch.
IOA, 93(a); R.I. SUPER. CT. CIV. ACTION ARB. R. 5(b).
22. E.D. MICH. R. 320)(3), (4); W.D. MICH. R. 420)(3), (4); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.4969 (West 1987); WASH. SUPER. CT. MAND. ARB. R. 7.3.
23. S.D. OHIO R. 4.4, Appendix Order 85-1, 11.3; COLO. Rev. STAT. § 13-22-405(3)
(1973); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361(d) (Purdon 1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
7.06.060 (Supp. 1991).
24. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-29 (West Supp. 1991).
25. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.400C2)(c), (d) (1988).
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compensation and trial cost are assessed in some states and courts. Only
one state requires payment of arbitrator compensation, fees, and costs of
the arbitration? Finally, the District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction
requiring payment of arbitrator compensation, trial and arbitration costs,
expert trial witness and arbitration witness costs, and interest on the
arbitration award." Of the twenty-seven different general compulsory
nonbinding ADR penalty provisions, fourteen permit waiver based on
economic hardship.'
B. Constitutionality
Compulsory nonbinding ADR rules and statutes permit trials de
novo in order to prevent violations of the United States Constitution and
of state constitutions. Except for deprivations of fundamental rights or
where no due process exists, the United States Constitution does not grant
a general federal right to trial for civil disputes. The Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution does grant a federal court
right to jury trial for controversies exceeding twenty dollars and for which
there existed a cause of action in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment
was passed. 1  Federal trial rights are also statutorily granted.3 2  General
rights to state court trials are found in state constitutions, rather than in
26. W.D. MICH. R. 430)(3); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-133(g), (i) (Supp. 1990); CAL.
CiV. PROC. CODE § 1141.21 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.103(5) (West Supp.
1991); ARIZ. ARB. R. 7(f).
27. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 16(c)(8)(D).
28. D.C. SUPER. CT. MAND. ARB. R. XIII(c).
29. M.D. FLA. R. 8.06(a); D.N.J. R. 47(G)(3); W.D. MICH. R. 430)(4); M.D.N.C. R.
608(a); W.D. OKLA. R. 43(P)(3); E.D. PA. R. 8.7E; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-133-I (Supp.
1990); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.21 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-311(4)
(1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.103(5) (West Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-29 (West
Supp. 1991); ARIZ. ARB. R. 7(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. MAND. ARB. R. XIII(c); ILL. SUP. CT. R.
ch. 110A, para. 93(c).
30. U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378-79 (1971).
31. Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
333 (1979).
32. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-2 (1989) (discrimination in public accommodations); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1989) (discrimination in public education).
33. States either provide for jury trial or court access or both in their constitutions.
E.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § II (jury trial); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23 jury trial); ARK. CONST.
art. 11, § 7 (jury trial); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (jury trial); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19 (jury
trial); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (jury trial); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (jury trial); GA. CONST. art.
I, § 1, para. 11 (jury trial); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, para. 12 (court access); HAW. CONST. art.
I, § 13 (jury trial); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7 (jury trial); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (court access);
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (jury trial); IND. CONST. art. I, § 12 (court access); IND. CONST. art. I,
§ 20 (jury trial); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9 (jury trial); KAN. CONST. Bill of Rts. § 5 (jury trial);
KY. CONST. § 7 (jury trial); Ky. CONST. § 14 (court access); LA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (court
access); MD. CONST. Dec. of Rts. art. XXIII (jury trial); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV, § 16
(jury trial); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14 (jury trial); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (jury trial); Miss.
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the United States Constitution. Courts have not applied Seventh
Amendment trial rights through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution 4
The United States Constitution indirectly protects trial rights
granted by federal and state laws. When constitutions or statutes establish
a federal or state right to trial, a property interest in the trial right exists.-S
This property interest cannot be denied without due process of law, as
required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
This Fourteenth Amendment protection is waivable, like any other
constitutional rightL" However, participation in compulsory ADR is not a
waiver of trial rights in exchange for ADR proceedings, because
participation is involuntary.
Trials de novo are included in compulsory ADR rules and statutes
to forestall constitutionally-based trial denial challenges, but the penalty
sections render trial de novo provisions insufficient constitutional
Band-Aids. While the fines may be waived in some states and courts,
there is no guarantee that they will be waived. Further, the looming
presence of penalties may discourage trial requests regardless of waiver
provisions.
The United States Supreme Court has held that laws and court
rules which serve to chill one's exercise of constitutional rights through
application of penalties is an unconstitutional due process violation.
Judge Richard Posner, of the United States Seventh Circuit Court of
CONST. art. HI, § 24 (court access); MO. CONST. art. I, § 14 (court access); MONT. CONST. art.
11, § 16 (court access); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26 (ury trial); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6 (jury
trial); NEv. CONST. art. I, § 3 (ury trial); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XX (jury trial); N.J.
CONST. art. I, para. 9 (jury trial); N.M. CONST. art. H, § 12 (jury trial); N.Y. CONST. art. I, §
2 (jury trial); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18 (court access); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25 (jury trial);
N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (court access); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13 (jury trial); OHIO CONsT. art.
I, § 5 (jury trial); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (court access); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (court
access); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 (jury trial); PA. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (jury trial); PA. CONST.
art. I, § 11 (court access); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15 (jury trial); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9 (court
access); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (jury trial); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (court access); TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 6 (jury trial); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (court access); TEX. CONST. art. I, §
15 (jury trial); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11 (court access); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 4 (court access);
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 12 (jury trial); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (jury trial); WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 21 (jury trial); W. VA. CONST. art. HI, § 13 (jury trial); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 5 (jury trial);
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (court access).
34. Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U.S. 219, 235 (1916).
35. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-34 (1982).
36. Id. at 432. See also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976); Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166 (1974).
37. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 402-06 (1977); Davis v. U.S., 411 U.S. 233,
243-45 (1973); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
38. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 631 (1969); U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968); Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965).
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Appeals, was justifiably skeptical about penalty provisions. He noted that
they create legality problems because they are "potent disincentives to
insisting on a trial. "39 Compulsory nonbinding ADR penalties chill the
exercise of trial rights by punishing people for asserting those rights.
Penalties are devices used to deter future action.40 As financial
disincentives, ADR penalties are devices used to deter disputants from
resorting to trial. Although this deterrence function does further the
underlying general ADR docket reduction goal, 4' its success in actually
deterring exercise of trial rights is unknown. Reports indicate that a
minimal number of cases using ADR reach trial. The studies do not
conclusively indicate whether that result stems from deference or from
satisfaction with ADR.'2
IV. PENALTY PROVISIONS AND RULE 16 oF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes courts
to encourage pretrial settlement. However, that authority is limited.
Courts do not have the authority to force settlement on the parties.
Compulsory ADR penalty provisions provide federal courts with the
means to circumvent the limitations on Rule 16 settlement authority.
Rule 16 governs federal judges' pretrial case management.
Federal judges have broad authority to call conferences betveen the
parties in order to clarify the nuances of the dispute, set the pretrial
schedule, and encourage settlement. Specifically, the Rule states that
courts may call pretrial conferences in order to "facilitat[e] the settlement
of the case. " ' Further, the Rule authorizes judges to discuss "the
39. Richard A. Posner, The Sumnmary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 391 (1986).
40. U.S. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 232 (1975). See also BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 1133 (6th Ed. 1990).
41. Christopher Simoni, Court-Annexed Arbitration In Oregon: One Step Forward and
Two Steps Back, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 237, 248 (Summer 1986); James C. Thornton,
Note, Court-Annexed Arbitration: Kentucky's Viable Alternative to Litigation, 77 Ky. L.J.
881, 895, 907(1988-89).
42. DAVID L. BRYANT, JUDICIALARBITRATIONIN CALIFORNIA: AN UPDATE23 (1989) (2.9 %
went to trial); STEVENS H. CLARKE, Er AL. COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN
EVALUATION OF ITS EFFEcTS 32 (1989) (8.7% went to trial).
43. (a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In
any action, the court may in its discretion direct the
attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented
parties to appear before it for a conference or
conferences before trial for such purposes as (1)
expediting the disposition of the action; (2)
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possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute."" To encourage settlement under Rule 16, judges have used
ADR forms as "extra judicial procedures."45
Judges can impose sanctions under Rule 16 when parties fail to
participate in good faith in pretrial management. 0 However, judges may
not use sanctions to coerce involuntary compromise or settlement. In
Kothe v. Smith,0 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a judgment
against the defendant, requiring payment of a $1000 penalty to the
plaintiff, a $1000 penalty to the expert witness, and $480 in court fees.'
The trial court punished the defendant because the case was not settled
before trial. The appeals court held that the penalties were impermissible
pressure tactics." The court noted that Rule 16(e) was intended to
encourage pretrial settlement, not to impose settlement on unwilling
parties.se Other federal courts and state courts have followed the Kothe v.
establishing early and continuing control so that the
case will not be protracted because of lack of
management; (3) discouraging wasteful pretrial
activities; (4) improving the quality of the trial
through more thorough preparation, and; (5)
facilitating the settlement of the case.
(c) Subjects to Be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences. The participants at any conference
under this rule may consider and take action with
respect to .... (7) the possibility of settlement or
the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
44. Id.
45. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 607 (D. Minn.
1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian Amer. Oil
Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
46. Sanctions. If a party or party's attorney
fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a
scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or
party's attorney is substantially unprepared to
participate in the conference, or if a party or party's
attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge,
upon, motion or the judge's own initiative, may
make such orders with regard thereto as are just
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0.
47. 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 669.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Smith rationale. s'
ADR penalty provisions coerce settlement, and directly violate
restrictions on Rule 16 judicial authority. As a Rule 16 pretrial settlement
procedure, ADR methods must follow the same requirements as any other
pretrial settlement technique. Judges mandating ADR may not impose
impermissible pressure tactics through penalties. The apparent purpose of
ADR penalties is to pressure the parties to be satisfied with the ADR
decision. When courts mandate ADR and penalize parties who are
dissatisfied with ADR decisions, the ADR decisions stand in the same
position as pretrial settlement offers and the penalties coerce parties to
accept the ADR decision. In short, judges are accomplishing settlement
coercion by calling it "ADR." Indeed, no sanctioning authority exists
allowing judges to apply ADR penalties when ADR is used under Rule
16(c)(7).
The use of ADR as a settlement device under Rule 16 appears to
operate like Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its
penalty provisions.s2 Under Rule 68, judges can require a party, who
rejected a pretrial settlement offer, to pay the costs incurred by both
parties from the date of the offer. Courts apply these sanctions only when
the offeree's trial judgment is less than the offer. Rule 68 sanctions are
distinguishable from compulsory nonbinding ADR penalties.
Because compulsory ADR is compelled by the court it is
distinguishable from Rule 68. The compulsory ADR parties are forced by
the judge into the ADR proceeding. They have no choice but to comply
and are penalized when they reject the ADR decision and fare no better at
trial. Under Rule 68, settlement offers are extended on a purely
voluntary basis. Even when parties accept Rule 68 offers during Rule 16
pretrial management, a voluntary offer is a prerequisite to triggering Rule
68 because Rule 16 prohibits coerced offers. Under the combination of
51. In re Ashcroft, 888 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1989); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989); Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838
F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D.
603, 606, 607 (1988); Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1987); People ex.
rel. Horwitz v. Canel, 215 N.E.2d 255 (1966); Mitchell v. Iowa Cab Co., 31 A.D.2d 519(1968).
52. At any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to
be taken against the defending party for the money or
property or to the effect specified in the offer, with
costs then accrued .... If the judgment finally
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than
the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
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Rules 16 and 68, the choice to make no settlement offer means parties
may freely proceed to trial without punishment concerns. In effect, the
offer under Rule 68 occupies the same position as the ADR decision
under compulsory nonbinding ADR. However, Rule 68 sanctions either
apply to voluntary settlement offers after parties have dickered over offer
terms or are not triggered because no offers were made. Compulsory
ADR penalties apply solely to involuntary pretrial settlement.
Judge Charles E. Clark, member of the United States Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure from 1935
through 1956, cautioned judges against compelling settlement.mAddressing
pretrial management techniques, Judge Clark stated that compelling
settlement could be deemed "dangerous as bringing in question the
impartiality of the tribunal whose duty it is to sit in judgment."s
V. THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE
A system of justice demands judicial impartiality. For the United
States, justice system to retain credibility and some semblance of order,
its judges must at least appear just. The United States Supreme Court has
held that justice in the court system must "satisfy the appearance of
justice."' s Courts have applied this requirement to reverse judicial
decisions or to disqualify judges. s
United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall noted that
the problem "is that people who have not served on the bench are often
all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of
judges." s7 Judges must promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding the
mere appearance of impropriety. Federal and state statutes exist to
further that end.s
53. Charles E. Clark, To An Understanding Use of Pre-Tial, 29 F.R.D. 454, 456
(1961). Judge Clark was a United States Court of Appeals judge for the Second Circuit.
54. Id.
55. Liljeberg v. Health Acquisition Services Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (quoting
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813,
825 (1986) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S.
11 14 (1954).
56. See infra notes 66-71.
57. Liljeberg v. Health Acquisition Services Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864, 865.
58. ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 20; GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. 7; ILL. CONST. art. VI, §
15(C); MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 165; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 35; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 18;
N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 15; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 11; UTAH
CONST. art. VHI, § 13; 28 U.S.C. § 455; ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-409 (1982); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 170.1 (West Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-45a (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 38.01, .02 (West Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-7 (1985);
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Federal Judiciary Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), requires United
States justice, judge or magistrate disqualification in proceedings "in
which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The
proceedings cover any litigation stage, including pretrial."' Congress'
intent was to promote public confidence in judicial impartiality by
demanding disqualification when a reasonable factual basis for doubting a
judge's impartiality exists. 60
This federal recusal statute applies an objective reasonable person
test.61 When a reasonable member of the public, knowing all the facts,
would conclude that a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
the judge should be disqualified from hearing the case.' This reasonable
person standard does not require that the judge perceive or have
knowledge of the disqualifying circumstances. "Scienter is not an element
of a violation of § 455(a)."o Consequently, a reasonable person may
question judicial integrity without the judge's awareness of the appearance
of partiality. In such instances, the judge is not required to disqualify him
or herself until he or she is aware of the outward appearance of
partiality.' The unequivocal message from Congress and the United
States Supreme Court is that partiality in fact does not have to exist.
IND. CODE ANN. § 33.2.1-8-1-10 (Burns Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.1606 (West
1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-311 (1988); LA. CODE. CiV. PROC. ANN. art. 151 (West Supp.
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 487.40 (West
1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 508.090 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-803 (1990);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-739 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-49 (West 1987); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 14 (McKinney 1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2701.03 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit.20, § 1401 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 14.210 (1990); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
21.005 (Vernon 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-1 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 61
(Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 17-7(2) (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.28.030 (1988);
W. VA. CODE § 51-2-8 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.19 (1981).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988) "(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(d) For the purposes of this section . . . (1) 'proceeding' includes pretrial,
trial, appellate review, or other stages of litigation .... .
60. HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, JUDICIARY - DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES ACT OF 1974,
H. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
See generally Liljeberg v. Health Acquisition Services Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860.
61. Id. See generally Wheeler v. Southland Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1251 (6th Cir.
1989); U.S. v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989); Parker v. Connors Steel
Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 864 F.2d 795 (1988), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1066, (1989); Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 279 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Browning v. Jabe, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l Inc.,
832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987); Trotter v. International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union, Local 13, 704 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1983).
62. HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, JUDICIARY - DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES ACT OF 1974,
H. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
63. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859.
64. Id. at 861.
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Maintaining public confidence in the fairness of the administration of
justice is paramount.
A § 455(a) appearance of partiality must originate from an
extrajudicial source. A judge is not considered partial based on having
engaged in prior judicial functions in the case at issue. Judges who issue
pretrial orders, encourage settlement, make in-court rulings on the case at
issue, or who have heard other cases with one or more of the same
parties, are not automatically deemed partial. 6, However, any partiality
which manifests itself in case management, in court proceedings, or in
judicial fumctions generally, may require recusal. Courts have defined
disqualifying partiality as a pecuniary interest in the litigation's outcome, 66
a failure to distance oneself from one's own earlier ruling to address the
same case on remand,6 a personal relationship with a party,6' comments
indicating the suit should not have been filed, 9 a personal animosity
toward an attorney, 70 or serving as a one-person grand jury and presiding
over contempt trials stemming from the same grand jury proceeding.7'
A. Partiality and ADR Rules
Judicial rulemaking and lobbying for laws regarding the judiciary,
are not judicial functions, but are legislative functions outside a judge's
adjudicatory role.72 When judges promulgate rules or openly encourage
statutes which cause a reasonable person to question judicial impartiality,
either those judges should not adjudicate cases affected by such rules or
statutes, or the rules and statutes should be abolished.
A reasonable person would probably not consider judge-made rules
65. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); Wheeler v. Southland Corp.,
875 F.2d 1246, 1251; Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir.
1988); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 279; Hasbrouck v.
Texaco, Inc., 830 F.2d 1513, 1524 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 2535
(1990); U.S. v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1985); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776
F.2d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
66. Liljeberg v. Health Acquisition Services Corp., 486 U.S. 847; Aetna Life Ins. v.
LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (judgment vacated and recusal); Connally v. Georgia, 429
U.S. 245 (1977) (udgment vacated); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57
(1972) (recusal); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926) (reversal and recusal).
67. U.S. v. White, 846 F.2d 678, 696 (1 1th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Smith
v. Scott, 488 U.S. 984 (1988) (recusal).
68. Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988) (recusal).
69. U.S. v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989) (recusal).
70. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11 (1954)
(reversal and recusal).
71. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1954) (reversal).
72. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734
(1980).
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or judge-encouraged statutes mandating nonbinding ADR as indicative of
partiality. This conclusion may be drawn based on the nonbinding
ingredient. Conversely, when such rules are supplemented with punitive
measures triggered by trial requests, a reasonable person might conclude
that an overworked, underpaid judge may affect a decision on the merits
to, at least, prevent trial petitioners from faring as well in the trial as they
did in ADR proceedings.7 The resulting penalty would punish the
petitioning party and set an example. A reasonable person might then
conclude that an appearance of injustice or of partiality exists.
Disqualifying all judges who promulgate or encourage
penalty-carrying ADR rules or statutes would ill serve ADR and the
judiciary. ADR would become a pariah. The benefits of ADR would not
be realized because judges would not mandate it for fear that trials de
novo would be requested. Furthermore, existing ADR rules and statutes
would be revoked and new rules or statutes would not be enacted. The
reasonable solution would be to remove the penalty provision sections in
order to maintain the appearance of justice. Without penalty provisions,
judges would have no reason to affect the trial outcome in order to, at
least, equalize trial and ADR outcomes.
VI. JUDICIAL RULEMAKING AUTHORITY AND PENALTY PROVISIONS
State and federal courts are usually granted general authority to
make local rules.74 Federal authority is granted under Rule 83 of the
73. United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist has been publicly vocal in
pursuing increased salaries and decreased workloads for the judiciary. E.g., Rehnquist:
Judicial Caseload Justifies Raise, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 1, 1991, § I, at 5; Rehnquist
Applauds Pay Raises for Judges, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at A22 (home ed.); Raise
Bolsters the Judiciary, Rehnquist Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, § 1, at 10 (late ed.);
Chief Justice Makes Plea for More Federal Judgeships to Help in Fight Against Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1990, § 1, at 10 (late ed.); Opposing a Raise for Federal Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1989, § 12NJ, at 26 (late ed. - final); New Jersey Q & A: Harold A.
Ackerman; Seeking a Raise for Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1989, § 12NJ, at 3
Cate ed. - final); Most U.S. judges earn more off the bench, study says, CHICAGO TRIB.,
June 5, 1989, § 1, at 8 (final ed.); Most Federal Judges Get Outside Income, L.A. TIMES,
June 5, 1989, pt. 1, at 8 (southland ed.); U.S. Judges Earn Considerably More Than Salary,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1989, at B6 (late ed. - final); Rehnquist Urges Congress to Increase
Judges' pay 30%, CHICAGO TRIB., May 4, 1989, News § at 4, zone M (final ed.); L.A.
TiMES, May 4, 1989, pt. 1, at 2 (home ed.); N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1989, at B12 (late city
final ed.); Rehnquist Urges Raise for Judges; 30% Boost Needed Now, Congress Told,
WASH. POST, May 4, 1989, at A4 (final ed.).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987). See also COLO.
CONST. art. VI, § 21; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3; GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, q 1; HAW. CONST. art.
VI, § 7; LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a); MICH. CONST., art. VI, § 5;
Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 25; N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. 73-a; N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, 9 3; N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 13(2); OHIO
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a). Both
sources permit district courts to proscribe "rules for the conduct of their
business."'s Congress has also authorized rulemaking for establishing pilot
ADR programs in selected district courts. That authority extends to
creating penalty provisions. 6 The rules must, however, be consistent with
Acts of Congress and United States Supreme Court practice and
procedure.
The general standard is that local rules are necessary in order to
carry out the conduct of a district court's business. 7  Rulemaking
authority is not limitless and the United States Supreme Court may
exercise its authority to "ensure that the local rules are consistent with the
principles of right and justice."7' The Court has abolished some local rules
because they do not help carry out the courts' business, 79 because they do
not follow United States Supreme Court practice,80 or because they are
inconsistent with established Acts of Congress."' Compulsory nonbinding
ADR is frequently provided for in local court rules.8 Clearly,
compulsory nonbinding ADR is not inconsistent with United States
Supreme Court practice because it is indirectly provided for in Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Y Although compulsory nonbinding
ADR may help courts conduct their business, penalty provisions are
superfluous to that end. With compulsory nonbinding ADR, the parties
are already channeled into a settlement procedure which relieves docket
CONST. art. IV, sec. 5(B); S.C. CoNST. art. V, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12; VT. CONST. ch.
1I, § 37; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 24; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-202
(1987); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68070 (West Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-14 (West
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 561 (1974); IDAHO CODE § 1-212(1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, 1-104 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.4201 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 20-321 (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.05 (West 1990); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.120
(Michie 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 23, 24 (West Supp. 1991); OR. RaV. STAT. §
1.006 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-402, 407 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-6 (1953).
75. "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time
to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with
Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed [by the Supreme Court]."
28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988). "Each district court by action of a majority of the judges
thereof may from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to
comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules."
FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651, 655.
77. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987).
78. Id. (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
79. Id. at 646-50.
80. Id. at 646; Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 647 (1960).
81. Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S., 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988); Thomas v. Am, 474
U.S. 140, 148 (1985); Alyeska Pipeline Serv., Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
269 (1975).
82. See supra notes 16-18.
83. Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 2, at 807.
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congestion. Furthermore, since participants are so satisfied with ADR,
there should not be a high frequency of trial de novo petitions."
Accordingly, the mere provision of ADR, without penalties, has fulfilled
the courts' business needs.
VII. ABOLISHING PENALTY PROVISIONS
In his insightful opinion for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge John Parker noted that "[a] suit at law is not a children's game, but
a serious effort on the part of adult human beings to administer justice."'
The administration of justice includes attorney accountability. Attorneys
are not obliged to make allegations or to conduct a case in accord with the
client's desires. In discussing this issue the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated:
A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court.
He may zealously represent his client, but only within the bounds
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, [and] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 .... We emphatically reject any suggestion that a lawyer may
shield his transgressions behind the simplistic plea that he only did
what his client desired. "
When an attorney's case has completed a mandatory nonbinding ADR
process, he or she should have a strong sense of the case's merits.
Pursuit of meritless cases or of cases for which there is no hope of
gaining a judgment more favorable than the ADR decision is frivolous.
The attorneys pursuing such cases, regardless of the client's desires,
should be held accountable. Accordingly, penalties should be used to
discourage the attorney's pursuit of frivolous litigation, rather than to
penalize the clients.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
sanctions when attorneys sign case documents with knowledge that the
84. JANE W. ADLER Er AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT
ARBITRATION PROGRAM 61-76 (1983); S. CLARK Er AL., supra note 42, at 57; DEBORAH R. HENSLER
Er AL., JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA 91 (1981); ROBERT J. MACCOUN, ALTERNATIVE
ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 47-62
(1988); BNA, Users Like, and Want More, Speed in Arbitration, I A.D.R. REP. 189 (Aug.
20, 1987); Hensler, supra note 8, at 276; Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 2, at 816; Michael
J. Norris, National Trends in Mandatory Arbitration, 17 COLO. LAW. 1313, 1314 (July
1988); Pearson, supra note 10, at 426, 431.
85. United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947).
86. Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Ctr., Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th Cir. 1985).
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document is not well grounded in fact, not supported by existing law, or
does not advance a good faith argument for a change in the law.7 Courts
may impose sanctions when such documents are signed to harass, cause
court delay, or increase litigation costs.U Almost every state court system
has a similar rule." Courts have upheld Rule 11 sanctions against
attorneys for filing an appeal when the trial court deemed the claims
frivolous,9 for pursuing an argument after its final disposition on
summary judgment," and for pursuing an action after learning it was
groundless. 92 Some courts limit application of sanctions to signing papers
with knowledge of frivolity or when failing to inquire into the case
87. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation .... If a pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
88. Id.
89. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-15-14 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-211 (Supp.
1990); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 864 (West 1984); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-824
(1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2011 (West Supp. 1991); TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 9.012 (Vernon Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1990);
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.185 (West 1988); WYO. STAT. § 1-14-128 (Supp. 1991);
ALA. C.P.R. II ARIz. C.P.R. 11; ARK. C.P.R. 11; COLO. C.P.R. 11; CONN. SUPER. CT.
R. § 111; DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 11; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. 11; IDAHO C.P.R. 11(a)(1);
IND. C.P.R. TR. 11; IoWA C.P.R. 80; KY. C.P.R. 11; ME. C.P.R. 11; MD. C.P.R. 1-311;
MASS. C.P.R. 11; MICH. C.P.R. 2.114(E), (F); MINN. C.P.R. 11; Miss. C.P.R. 11; Mo.
C.P.R. 55.03; MONT. C.P.R. 11; N.J. GEN. APP. R. 1:4-8; N.M. D. CT. C.P.R. 1-011;
N.Y. UNIF. R. § 130.1-1; N.D.C.P.R. 11; OHIO C.P.R. 11; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. 11; S.C.
C.P.R. 11; TENN. C.P.R. 11; UTAH C.P.R. 11; VT. C.P.R. 11; VA. S.CT. R. 1:4(a);
WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 11; W. VA. C.P.R. 11; Wis. C.P.R. 802.05.
90. Hamer v. County of Lake, 871 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
Patner v. County of Lake, 110 S. Ct. 146 (1989).
91. Deere & Co. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 855 F.2d 385, 392 (7th
Cir. 1988).
92. Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 210 (4th Cir. 1988); City of
Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1988); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835
F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987).
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merits. '3 Attorneys filing trial de novo requests in ADR cases, should be
sanctioned under Rule 11 for pursuing frivolous cases, or for signing the
trial request with knowledge that there is no hope of obtaining a trial
outcome more favorable than the ADR decision.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 permits federal courts to sanction any attorney
who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously." 9' The statute's purpose is to limit the abuse of court
processes, and it is triggered by attorneys litigating in bad faith. s  Section
1927 is grounded in the recognition that "[s]uits are easy to file and hard
to defend. Litigation gives lawyers opportunities to impose on their
adversaries costs much greater than they impose on their clients. The
greater the disparity, the more litigation becomes a predatory instrument
rather than a method of resolving honest disputes."'
Applying Section 1927 courts have held that continuing an action
after discovering that it is meritless is unreasonable and vexatious.9
"Dogged pursuit of a colorable claim" is actionable bad faith."
Relitigating a matter already reasonably decided is frivolous and in bad
faith.?5 Accordingly, multiplying proceedings by pursuing trials de novo
is a Section 1927 violation for which attorneys should be held
accountable.
"Frivolity, like obscenity, is often difficult to define. With courts
struggling to remain afloat in a constantly rising sea of litigation, a
frivolous appeal can itself be a form of obscenity."'° The contribution to
dockets of frivolous requests for trials de novo can be effectively
extinguished by rigorous application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
93. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844
F.2d 216, 222 (5th Cir. 1988); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 557 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Barton v. E.F. Hutton, 484 U.S. 822 (1987).
94. Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct
cases in any court of the United States or any
Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess
costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927.
95. HOUSE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1980, H. R.
CONF. REP. NO. 1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2716,
2782. See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980).
96. In re T.C.I., Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).
97. Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Continental
Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986); Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d
217, 222 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nonz. Hagerty v. Keller, 474 U.S. 968 (1985).
98. In re T.C.I., Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445.
99. Hughes v. Hoffman, 750 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1984).
100. WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Civil Procedure and of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. After ADR proceedings,
attorneys can assess the merits of their cases and should be sanctioned for
pursuing meritless cases. ADR penalty provisions are, therefore,
unnecessary because the appropriate parties to sanction are already
sanctionable under existing laws and rules.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Compulsory nonbinding ADR is an effective docket reduction
method,"' but the merits of its accompanying penalty provisions are
doubtful. The deterrence effects of penalty provisions make them at least
constitutionally suspect. Enforcement of compulsory ADR penalty
provisions under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stretches
judicial authority beyond appropriate limits. Further, the appearance of
justice may be tarnished by judicial penalty enforcement when their
creating rules and statutes were judge made or influenced.
ADR penalties are currently misdirected toward discouraging the
exercise of rights to trial. Legitimate judicial concerns do exist when
parties pursue trials de novo on frivolous complaints. Such concerns are
appropriately addressed through federal and state court rules and laws
governing attorney responsibility for filing well grounded complaints.
Responsibility for unnecessarily increasing litigation should be placed
where it belongs, on the attorney's shoulders.
Penalty provisions included in compulsory nonbinding ADR rules
and statutes should be abolished. They pose serious legality questions.
They taint both a valuable dispute resolution mechanism and the image of
a judiciary concerned about its workload. Finally, based on the success
of ADR,'02 penalty provisions are simply unnecessary.
Nancy F. Reynolds
101. MICHIGAN MEDIATION PRACTICE § 1.07 (Mary R. Minnet ed., 1987); Nejelski &
Zeldin, supra note 2, at 808; Pearson, supra note 10, at 429.
102. See supra notes 84 and 101.

